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Benjamin WALD 
ABSTRACT: Belief has a special connection to truth, a connection not shared by mental 
states like imagination. One way of capturing this connection is by the claim that belief 
aims at truth. Normativists argue that we should understand this claim as a normative 
claim about belief – beliefs ought to be true. A second important connection between 
belief and truth is revealed by the transparency of belief, i.e. the fact that, when I 
deliberate about what to believe, I can settle this deliberation only by appeal to 
considerations I take to show p to be true. It is natural to think that there is a connection 
between these two features of belief, that the fact that believing for non-evidential 
considerations would be irrational can help to explain why it is impossible, and Shah and 
Velleman make exactly this argument. However, as I shall argue, we cannot explain 
transparency on the basis of a normative requirement on belief. For this explanation to 
work non-evidential considerations would have to fail to be reasons for belief, and we 
would have to be able to explain why we are unable to form beliefs on the basis of non-
evidential considerations by appealing to the fact that they fail to be reasons for belief. 
However, while it is plausible that non-evidential considerations are not in fact reasons 
for belief, the explanatory picture is the other way around. Such considerations only fail 
to be reasons for belief because we are unable to form beliefs on their basis.  
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Introduction 
Belief has a special connection to truth, a connection not shared by other 
representational mental states such as imagination or supposition. We can see this 
connection in the fact that there is nothing out of the ordinary in saying “I am 
imagining that it is raining, but it isn’t raining,” but the Moore-paradoxical “I 
believe that it is raining, but it isn’t raining” is strikingly odd. One way that many 
philosophers have tried to cash the connection between belief and truth is in 
terms of the claim that, in some sense, belief aims at truth. However, there is 
substantial disagreement over the correct philosophical account of this claim. 
Beliefs, after all, are not themselves an agent who can have their own aims. 
According to normativists, the claim that beliefs aim at truth should be 
understood as a normative claim.1 To say that belief aims at truth is to say that one 
                                                                
1 Cf. Pascal Engel, “Doxastic Correctness,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87, (2013): 
199-216, Pascal Engel, “In Defense of Normativism about the Aim of Belief,” in The Aim of 
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ought to hold a belief only if it is true, or that truth provides the standard of 
correctness for belief, for example.  
Along with being the aim of belief, truth also has another interesting 
relation to belief. We can normally only form beliefs on the basis of considerations 
that we take to show the belief to be true. This is why, on proposing his wager as 
an argument for belief in God, Pascal goes on to recommend means by which one 
could bring oneself to actually form the belief that God exists. Accepting that 
belief in God is a good bet is not sufficient to bring about belief in God; you need 
to attend church, take communion, study the bible, and so on in the hopes of 
altering your evaluation of the truth of the belief in order to bring about this 
doxastic change. The situation is very different in cases where you become 
convinced that a consideration shows a claim to be true. In this case, we can form 
the belief directly, without adopting other means. This phenomenon has been 
called the transparency of belief. In some sense, the question of what to believe is 
transparent to the question of what is the case.2 This explains why only evidential 
considerations, considerations that show the belief likely to be true in some way, 
can help us settle the question of what to believe.  
It is natural to think that the aim of belief and the transparency of belief are 
related in some way. Both, after all, involve a special relationship between belief 
and truth. In particular, if we accept that the aim of belief should be understood in 
terms of a normative role for truth, then this looks like it should help us explain 
the transparency of belief. The fact that forming beliefs that aren’t true is 
normatively forbidden may help us explain why it is impossible to do so, or at 
least to do so directly. Nishi Shah and David Velleman3 argue for just such an 
explanatory relation between the aim of belief and the transparency of belief. In 
fact, this explanatory link provides the main argument for their version of 
normativism about belief. For normativism to explain transparency, the agent 
                                                                                                                                       
Belief, ed. Timothy Chan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 32-63, Ralph Wedgwood, 
“The Aim of Belief,” Philosophical Perspectives 16, (2002): 267-297, Nick Zangwill, “Directions 
of Fit and Normative Functionalism,” Philosophical studies 91, 2 (1998): 173-203, Nick 
Zangwill, “The Normativity of the Mental,” Philosophical Explorations 8, (2005): 1-19. 
2 This notion of transparency is related to but distinct from that described by Gareth Evans 
in Varieties of Reference (Oxford University Press, 1982). Evans focuses on the relation between 
truth and belief when we are forming beliefs, rather than in coming to know what we believe. I 
discuss how we should understand Velleman’s notion of transparency in more detail in section 
2. 
3 See Nishi Shah, “How Truth Governs Belief,” The Philosophical Review 112, 4, (2003): 447-
482, Nishi Shah and J. David Velleman, “Doxastic Deliberation,” The Philosophical Review 114, 
4, (2005): 497-534. 
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must be aware of, or at least sensitive to, the normative requirements on belief. 
Otherwise, these normative requirements could not explain the psychological fact 
of transparency. This leads Shah and Velleman to argue that normativism is not 
(or not only) an independent normative truth, but part of the possession 
conditions for the concept of belief. In order to possess the concept of belief, Shah 
and Velleman argue, an agent must accept a normative claim, that beliefs are 
correct if and only if they are true. Thus, believers sophisticated enough to possess 
the concept of belief, and hence able to deliberate explicitly about what to believe, 
cannot help but be aware of the norm of truth, and this awareness can explain 
why beliefs formed through deliberation must be formed on the basis of 
considerations taken to be relevant to the truth of the belief.  
However, tempting as it is, I do not think this explanatory strategy can 
ultimately be successful. We cannot explain transparency on the basis of a 
normative requirement on belief, not even if this norm is part of the possession 
conditions for the concept of belief. As I shall argue, for this explanation to work 
non-evidential considerations must fail to be reasons for belief. Furthermore, we 
must be able to explain why we are unable to form beliefs on the basis of non-
evidential considerations by appealing to the fact that they fail to be reasons for 
belief. However, while it is plausible that non-evidential considerations are not in 
fact reasons for belief, the explanatory picture is the other way around. Such 
considerations only fail to be reasons for belief because we are unable to form 
beliefs on their basis. In other words, if we were able to form beliefs for non-
evidential considerations, then such considerations would in fact count as 
perfectly valid reasons for belief. It is only our inability to actually believe for such 
reasons that prevents them from being reasons for us. And this shows that Shah 
and Velleman’s strategy of explaining transparency in terms of a normative 
requirement fails.4 Furthermore, it provides strong reason to doubt that any 
similar explanatory strategy could succeed. This removes the main support for 
Shah and Velleman’s theory of the aim of belief. But it also potentially has wider 
consequences. It remains quite plausible that the aim of belief and the 
transparency of belief have some kind of explanatory relation, and indeed that 
transparency is explained by the aim of belief. But if normativism cannot explain 
                                                                
4 For other criticisms of Shah and Velleman’s position see Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss, 
“Against Belief Normativity,” in The Aim of Belief, ed. Timothy Chan (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 80-99, Conor McHugh, “Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation,” 
Analytic Philosophy 54, 4 (2013): 447-465, Andrei Buleandra, “Doxastic Transparency and 
Prescriptivity,” Dialectica 63, 3 (2009): 325-332, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, “No Norm Needed: 
On the Aim of Belief,” The Philosophical Quarterly 56, 225 (2006): 499-516, Asbjørn Steglich-
Petersen, “Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism?” Dialectica 62, 4 (2008): 541-547.  
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transparency, then this provides some reason to doubt that normativism is the 
correct account of the aim of belief.  
1. Transparency 
So what exactly is transparency? As Shah and Velleman put it,  
The deliberative question whether to believe that p inevitably gives way to the 
factual question whether p, because the answer to the latter question will 
determine the answer to the former.5  
In other words, when we deliberate about whether to believe p, we must settle 
our deliberation on the basis of exactly the same considerations that we would use 
to settle the question of whether p. Other considerations, although we might 
think about them and perhaps even wish we could form our belief on their basis, 
just do not settle the question of whether p, and so cannot settle the question of 
whether to believe that p either. We cannot, for instance, come to believe p 
because it would make us feel better, or because believing it would be good for our 
health, or because it would make our spouse happy.  
This stands in stark contrast to how we deliberate about attitudes such as 
imagining or hypothesizing. We can decide to imagine that p, or hypothesize that 
p, for reasons that are utterly irrelevant to the truth of p. I can imagine that I have 
won an award just because imagining this would make me happy, but I cannot 
believe that I have won the award because the belief would make me happy. Thus, 
there is some special link here between belief and truth that shows up in our first 
personal deliberation about what to believe. It is important to note that this is not 
itself a normative claim – it is not that it is wrong to believe for pragmatic reasons, 
but that it is impossible to settle deliberation about what to believe by reference to 
anything other than evidential considerations, i.e. considerations we take to bear 
on the truth of the claim. There are actually two related claims being made here. 
The first is that one question, whether to believe that p, is transparent to a second 
question, whether p, when we deliberate. The second claim is that only what the 
agent takes to be evidence that p is true can be used by the agent to settle the 
question of whether p. However, I shall focus on the first claim, and take the 
second claim as given. The second claim will also gain some support from Shah 
and Velleman’s account of the nature of deliberation, discussed in section 3.6 
                                                                
5 Shah and Velleman, “Doxastic Deliberation,” 499. 
6 The fact of transparency is not uncontroversial. Some philosophers think it is possible, and 
even sometimes rational, to give weight to non-evidential considerations in deliberating about 
what to believe (Cf. Conor McHugh, “The Illusion of Exclusivity,” European Journal of 
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Now, we should be clear about the strength of this transparency claim. 
Obviously, we might still be influenced in deciding whether to believe p by facts 
that have nothing to do with the truth of the belief. If I deliberate about whether 
to believe that my wife is cheating on me, I may be influenced by my deep desire 
not to believe this into discounting good evidence, in a way I would not have done 
had the question been about the faithfulness of someone else. What transparency 
rules out is that I could consciously decide not to believe that my wife is cheating 
on me on this basis. I can still be influenced by considerations that do not bear on 
the truth of the belief, but these must operate ‘behind the scenes,’ so to speak. The 
way in which these factors might influence my deliberation about whether or not 
to believe p is exactly the same way that they would operate in my deliberation 
about whether p, so we can retain the idea that the first question is transparent to 
the second.7 Furthermore, the claim that deliberation operates in this way is not 
merely armchair philosophical speculation. Psychological research on cases of so-
called ‘motivated reasoning,’ where reasoners are incentivized to come to 
particular conclusions, suggests that the influence of practical incentives is 
indirect. Studies shows that, while people are in fact more likely to form a belief 
when they have been given practical incentives to form that belief, there is no 
conscious link between the non-evidential considerations and the formation of the 
belief. People spent longer looking at evidence that supported the belief they were 
incentivized to form, and spent longer searching their memory for instances that 
supported the desired belief,8 and the subjects were presumably unaware of this 
bias in their search for evidence. This provides empirical support for the claim that 
we can only form beliefs based on evidential considerations – when practical 
considerations affect our judgment, they do so by subconsciously affecting the way 
we look for or deliberate on evidential considerations, rather than by figuring 
explicitly in our deliberation. It is plausible that this is not just a contingent 
limitation on human believers, either. After all, a being that could form beliefs on 
the basis of non-evidential considerations could form beliefs on the basis of 
considerations they knew to be irrelevant to the truth of the belief. Thus they 
                                                                                                                                       
Philosophy, forthcoming, DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12032). However, I shall assume for this paper that 
transparency is a real phenomenon. 
7 We can also retain the claim that only considerations taken to be evidence for p can be used to 
settle the question of whether p, since the non-evidential factors are not being taken by the 
agent to settle the question of whether p, but instead unconsciously influencing the agent’s 
thinking about whether other considerations are good evidence for p. 
8 Cf. Arie W. Kruglanski and Donna M. Webster, “Motivated Closing of the Mind: ‘Seizing’ and 
‘Freezing,’” Psychological Review 103, 2 (1996): 263-283, Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated 
Reasoning,” Psychological Bulletin 108, 3 (1990): 480-498.  
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could form beliefs without regard to the truth of the belief, and such doxastic 
voluntarism is generally taken to be conceptually impossible,9 making 
transparency a conceptual truth about belief.10  
2. Belief as a Normative Concept 
Shah and Velleman argue that their version of normativism provides the best 
explanation of the phenomenon of doxastic transparency. They argue that the 
concept of belief has as part of its possession conditions the acceptance of a 
normative claim: namely, that beliefs are correct only if they are true.11 Thus, to 
possess the concept of belief at all requires us to endorse a normative claim about 
when it is correct to hold a belief, so no believer can fail to be aware of this 
normative claim. The fact that believers necessarily endorse a norm for belief can 
be used, Shah and Velleman argue, to explain doxastic transparency.  
Transparency, as Shah and Velleman understand it, only shows up when we 
deliberate about what to believe. As I said above, it is possible for belief to be 
influenced by non-evidential considerations, as long as these considerations 
operate behind the scenes. When beliefs are formed without deliberation, 
however, all of the influences on belief are similarly behind the scenes. It is only 
in deliberation that we explicitly consider what considerations count as reasons 
for forming a belief, and hence only here that there is a difference between the 
role of some considerations as reasons on which the belief is formed as opposed to 
mere causal influences in the formation of belief. Thus there is no distinction 
between the way that evidential and non-evidential considerations operate on 
beliefs formed without deliberation. However, when we deliberate explicitly 
about what to believe, only evidential considerations are relevant to settling the 
question. So what explains the fact that transparency shows up only when we 
deliberate? Well, because the deliberation is about what to believe, the agent 
                                                                
9 Jonathan Bennett, “Why is Belief Involuntary?” Analysis 50 (1990): 87-107, Bernard Williams, 
“Deciding to Believe,” in Language, Belief, and Metaphysics, ed. Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. 
Munitz (New York: SUNY Press, 1970), 95-111. 
10 If transparency has a contingent psychological explanation then so much the worse for 
attempts to give a normative explanation of the phenomenon. However, I shall assume, in line 
with Shah and Velleman, that transparency is a conceptual truth. 
11 ‘Correct’ here is supposed to be a normative term, rather than a purely descriptive term. 
Several philosophers take the norms of belief to be given in terms of correctness. See, for 
example, Wedgwood, “The Aim of Belief,” Engel, “In Defense of Normativism,” and Alan 
Gibbard, “Truth and Correct Belief,” Philosophical Issues 15 (2005): 338-351. However, nothing 
in the argument hinges on using correctness: for our purposes the result is the same if the norm 
of belief is given in different normative terms, such as what we ought to believe, instead. 
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necessarily applies the concept of belief in thinking about the outcome of 
deliberation. If Shah and Velleman are right about the possession conditions for 
this concept, then this entails that the agent endorses a norm that says that the 
belief which is the outcome of the deliberation will be correct if and only if it is 
true. Furthermore, for some mental process to count as deliberation, the agent 
must aim to reach the correct conclusion. A mental activity that was not aimed at 
reaching the correct outcome wouldn’t count as deliberation at all – it would be 
idle imagining, perhaps, or even just a disconnected series of thoughts. So, in 
deliberating about what to believe, we are aiming to form a correct belief, due to 
the nature of deliberation, and we accept that only true beliefs are correct, due to 
the nature of belief. This, Shah and Velleman argue, shows that we are committed 
to forming the belief based only on factors we take to be relevant to its truth - just 
what doxastic transparency requires.12 
However, I do not think this proposed account could truly explain 
transparency. To see why, consider what the strength of the proposed norm would 
have to be for it to explain transparency. Normally, the fact that a norm applies to 
something does not serve to constrain deliberation in the way that transparency 
does. Imagine that a friend asks me what I think of their haircut, and I judge that 
the new look is a colossal mistake, so I deliberate about what to say. Imagine 
further that I endorse a norm that forbids lying. Nonetheless, it seems that my 
deliberation could still include considerations such as the fact that telling the truth 
will hurt their feelings, and I might well end up choosing to act on this 
consideration, despite my acceptance of the norm against lying. The norm 
forbidding lying tells me that I should not say that p unless I think p is true, but 
this does not prevent me from taking into account or acting on considerations that 
have nothing to do with the truth of p. With transparency, on the other hand, 
these other considerations are prevented from having any influence. Thus, if 
transparency is explained by a norm, this norm must be of a special sort, unlike 
familiar norms such as the one forbidding lying.  
We might try claiming that the norm of belief, unlike the norm against 
lying, is a decisive norm. While the norm against lying may provide some reason 
against lying, this reason still needs to be weighed against competing reasons to 
see if it is the strongest reason in this instance. However, perhaps the reason 
provided by the norm of belief is guaranteed to always be a decisive reason, 
outweighing any competing reasons. Thus, the agent has no need to consider 
                                                                
12 Shah and Velleman also discuss in more detail their conception of the nature of deliberation 
and a mechanism for how we transition from deliberation to judgment and from there to belief, 
but the details of this account are not relevant to my criticism of it, so I omit them here. 
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other potential reasons for belief, since they can be sure that the reason provided 
by the norm of belief will always win out. However, this too falls short of 
accounting for transparency. Even if an agent knows that some consideration 
provides a decisive reason, it still seems possible for them to be swayed in their 
deliberation into acting for a different reason. Acting against what one takes to be 
a decisive norm is irrational, to be sure, but it is also a familiar phenomenon – if 
this weren’t possible, then weakness of will would be much less prevalent. 
Consider again the norm against lying. Perhaps I have read a lot of Kant recently, 
and come to endorse the view that the norm against lying is a decisive norm, 
never outweighed by competing considerations. It still seems perfectly possible 
that, in a particular case, I might end up, through weakness of will, considering 
the harm to my friend’s feelings, and acting on this basis. But in the case of 
doxastic deliberation, such weakness of will is not just irrational, but impossible. 
Not even a decisive norm seems to explain this impossibility.13 
A final, and more promising, option is to hold that the norm of belief is a 
silencing norm. On this view, the norm of belief not only provides reasons that 
outweigh any competing reasons, it silences competing reasons, prevents them 
from having any rational weight at all. This entails that non-evidential 
considerations will fail to be reasons for belief. After all, the norm of belief is 
always in operation, and hence it will always silence non-evidential 
considerations. If they are always silenced, then non-evidential considerations will 
never have any weight in any deliberation about what to believe. But a 
consideration that never has any weight is thereby not a reason at all, so non-
evidential considerations will not count as reasons for belief. Alternatively, we 
might think that, rather than the norm of belief silencing and hence eliminating 
competing reasons, there just never were any other reasons in the domain of belief 
in the first place. Perhaps the norm of belief provides the only reasons to be had 
when it comes to belief. These two explanations are structurally distinct, but the 
upshot is the same in either case – non-evidential considerations just do not count 
as reasons for belief.  
If this were the correct interpretation of the strength of the proposed norm 
of belief, then Shah and Velleman would be arguing that possessing the concept of 
belief requires us to hold that the only things that count as reasons for belief at all 
are evidential considerations. This has better prospects of explaining why it is 
impossible, not just irrational, to form a belief on non-evidential considerations 
                                                                
13 This problem for Shah and Velleman’s account has been previously noted by Steglich-
Petersen, “No Norm Needed” and Sergio Tenenbaum, “Knowing the Good and Knowing What 
One is Doing,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2012): 91-117. 
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when deliberating. To believe on the basis of a non-evidential reason would, on 
this interpretation, involve deliberatively forming a belief not just on the basis of a 
less pressing reason, but on the basis of something that is not even thought to be a 
reason at all. It seems plausible that this is not in fact possible. In the case of 
practical reason Joseph Raz14 points out that I cannot choose to have a coffee 
because I love Sophocles. If my love of Sophocles fails to in any way render my 
drinking coffee intelligible, i.e. fails to be a reason to drink coffee, then this 
consideration cannot be my reason for acting, and so cannot settle my deliberation 
about what to do. Similarly, if a candidate reason for believing p wouldn’t render 
the formation of that belief at all intelligible, then it is plausible that it cannot be 
the agent’s reason for believing p. The belief might be caused by the consideration, 
through some arational psychological process, but unless the consideration is seen 
as at least some reason for the belief, it couldn’t count as the agent’s conclusion in 
deliberation.  
Furthermore, it seems plausible that this in fact how Shah thinks of the 
norm as functioning. For instance, he says that the effect of endorsing the norm of 
truth is that a strong disposition to block the influence of non-evidential types of 
influence is activated in cases of belief-formation that are governed by an agent’s 
application of the concept of belief.15 This suppression of non-evidential 
considerations sounds more like a case of silencing such considerations than it 
does merely outweighing them. Similarly, Shah states that  
belief’s standard of correctness does determine what counts as a reason for belief 
from within the first-personal deliberative point of view.16  
Shah here claims not only that the standard of correctness provides a reason, but 
also that it determines what counts as a reason. In other words, the claim of any 
other consideration to count as a reason at all depends on the norm of correctness, 
which suggests that it silences competing reasons.  
This approach obviously requires that there in fact be no non-evidential 
reasons for belief. Furthermore, the argument requires that our inability to form 
beliefs for non-evidential reasons were explained by the non-existence of any such 
reasons. I shall argue in section four that, were we able to believe for non-
evidential reasons, some of them would be perfectly good reasons for belief. This 
may seem to commit me to the unpopular view that there are in fact non-
                                                                
14 Joseph Raz, “When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive,” in his Engaging Reason: 
On the Theory of Value and Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5-21. 
15 Shah, “How the Truth Governs Belief,” 473. 
16 Shah, “How the Truth Governs Belief,” 472. 
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evidential reasons for belief. While this view is not obviously false,17 I am not 
committed to accepting this conclusion. Instead, we can hold that there are no 
non-evidential reasons for belief, but that the explanation of this fact is that it is 
impossible to form beliefs on the basis of non-evidential considerations. This, 
combined with a modest internalism about reasons for belief, entails that non-
evidential considerations cannot be reasons for belief. However, this order of 
explanation will not help Shah and Velleman’s argument, since they need the 
opposite order of explanation. In section five, then, I shall present a brief 
explanation of weak internalism about reasons for belief and show how, combined 
with transparency, it entails that there are no non-evidential reasons for belief, 
and also why this nonetheless is no help for Shah and Velleman. This will show 
how we can accept the arguments of section four without being committed to the 
existence of non-evidential reasons for belief.  
3. Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief 
For something to be a reason for belief implies that were we to form a belief on 
the basis of this consideration we would not be rationally criticisable, ceteris 
paribus,18 whereas we are rationally criticisable for forming beliefs on the basis of 
things that are not in fact normative reasons for belief. Thus, if we accept Shah 
and Velleman’s claim that all believers must accept a norm that silences all non-
evidential reasons for belief, then it should be rationally criticisable to form beliefs 
on the basis of these considerations. In this section, I shall argue that this is not 
true – if we were to form beliefs on the basis of some non-evidential 
considerations, this would not be rationally criticisable. Now, as I shall argue in 
section five, we might still hold that these considerations fail to be reasons for 
belief. In particular, they may fail to be reasons for belief precisely because we 
cannot form beliefs on the basis of such considerations. However, even so, it still 
remains true that were we able to form beliefs for these reasons, there would be 
nothing rationally criticisable about doing so.  
                                                                
17 For a defense of non-evidential reasons for belief, see Andrew Reisner, “The Possibility of 
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem,” Philosophical Studies 
145, 2 (2009): 257-272.  
18 The ceteris paribus clause here is important. We can be rationally criticisable for forming a 
belief on the basis of a genuine reason for belief if, for instance, there are stronger reasons 
against the belief, or a defeater for this reason is present. Still, there remains an important 
conceptual link between reasons for belief and rationality, which we can use to determine when 
a consideration counts as a reason for belief. 
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So why think that there are cases where it is not rationally criticisable to 
form a belief for non-evidential considerations? The basic argument is as follows. 
Opponents of non-evidential reasons for belief in general accept that non-
evidential reasons can give us reasons to bring it about that we believe the 
proposition in question. For example, if an evil demon threatens to destroy the 
world unless you believe that the earth is flat, this provides you with a strong 
reason to take whatever means you can to bring it about that you believe this - 
read flat-earth arguments, try to convince yourself that there is a conspiracy 
against flat-earthers, get someone to hypnotize you, and so on. However, it seems 
very strange to say that it is rationally permissible to bring it about that you 
believe something, but were you able to bring yourself to believe the proposition 
directly, you would be rationally criticisable for doing so. Imagine someone who 
has the capacity to form beliefs on the basis of both evidential and non-evidential 
considerations, and who is deliberating about what to believe in the evil demon 
scenario. It seems highly implausible that he would be rationally criticisable for 
forming the belief that the world is flat on the basis of the demon’s threat. Of 
course, we might object that forming the belief directly is not criticisable but 
impossible. I think this is exactly right, and perhaps, as I suggest in section five, we 
might think that as a matter of fact we would therefore have no reason to do as 
the demon commands, since it may be necessary for something to be a reason for 
belief that it is possible to form beliefs for this very reason. However, Shah and 
Velleman cannot appeal to this impossibility without rendering their position 
circular. Shah and Velleman need it to be impossible to form beliefs for non-
evidential reasons because the agent would see it as violating the norm on belief 
that they must endorse to count as a believer; they cannot then explain the fact 
that it would violate the norm in terms of it being impossible to form the relevant 
belief. This is the core of my argument that it would not always be rationally 
criticisable to form a belief on the basis of a non-evidential consideration, and thus 
that there cannot be a general silencing norm forbidding forming beliefs for such 
reasons.  
The counterfactual with which I frame my argument here may seem 
problematic. I argue that in some circumstance if we were able to form beliefs for 
non-evidential considerations then this would not be rationally criticisable. 
However, transparency is a conceptual truth, and hence necessary, and it states 
that we can only form beliefs for evidential considerations. So, the antecedent of 
this counterfactual is necessarily false, and thus according to the standard 
Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals the whole counterfactual is vacuously true. 
Similarly, the existence of an agent who could believe for non-evidential reasons 
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is similarly impossible, making the counterfactual framed in terms of such an 
agent also vacuous and uninformative.  
I am not convinced that all counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are 
in fact vacuous. Consider, for instance, the claim that if Pythagoras’ theorem were 
false, mathematicians wouldn’t believe it. This seems non-vacuously true despite 
the necessary falsity of the antecedent.19 Still, I think we can make the same point 
without appealing to such counterpossible scenarios. Image instead an agent who 
is unsure of whether or not they can believe on the basis of non-evidential 
considerations. Perhaps they think they probably can’t, but they aren’t sure. 
When confronted by the evil demon considered above, this agent therefore tries 
to believe on the basis of the non-evidential considerations. If it is rationally 
criticisable to believe for non-evidential reasons, then it is rationally criticisable to 
try to believe for these reasons. But this agent does not seem rationally criticisable 
for making this attempt (although, depending on the scenario, they may be 
rationally criticisable for failing to recognize that it is impossible). On the other 
hand, imagine that this agent instead tries to believe that the earth is flat in order 
to annoy his philosophy teacher. In this case, the attempt does seem rationally 
criticisable, in a way that the attempt to satisfy the demon is not. While the goal is 
impossible in both cases, in the former the consideration speaks in favour of the 
belief, while in the latter it fails to do so. However, on Shah and Velleman’s 
account, all such non-evidential considerations should equally be rationally 
criticisable to base beliefs on (or to try to do so), since all are equally ruled out as 
reasons by the aim of belief.  
We might worry about the principle that, if it would be rationally 
criticisable to do something, then it is rationally criticisable to try to do it. But this 
principle is suggested by the plausible claim that agents are not rationally 
criticisable for failures caused by external factors over which they have no control. 
If I intend to visit Paris, I am rationally criticisable if I fail to buy a ticket or don’t 
make plans to arrive at the airport on time, but I am not criticisable if the flight is 
cancelled due to a surprise storm. Once we subtract factors over which the agent 
has no control, however, trying one’s hardest to do something and actually doing 
it are identical. To try one’s hardest to do something is to do everything in one’s 
                                                                
19 For further discussion of the view that counterpossibles can be non-vacuously true or false, 
and how to provide a semantics for them, see Jens Christian Bjerring, “On Counterpossibles,” 
Philosophical Studies 168, 2 (2014): 327-353, Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno, “Remarks on 
Counterpossibles,” Synthese 190 (2013): 639-660, David Vander Laan, Lewisian Themes: The 
Philosophy of David K. Lewis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), Daniel Nolan, 
“Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38, 4 (1997): 
535-572.  
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power to bring it about, and if external circumstances cooperate then one succeeds 
- there is no rationally relevant gap between the attempt and the success. This 
strongly suggests that the rational status of a successful action should be the same 
as a sufficiently determined attempt.  
A defender of Shah and Velleman might object that I have not established 
the direction of explanation I am arguing for between reasons and belief. I have 
argued that it is our inability to believe on the basis of non-evidential reasons that 
explains their not being reasons, rather than the other way around. But, it could 
be objected, the counterfactuals I have made use of don’t necessarily show this, 
even if true. They might instead show that if we were able to believe on the basis 
of these considerations that would be because they would, in that counterfactual 
situation, be reasons. Thus, a defender of Shah and Velleman’s view could object 
that if I could respond to non-evidential considerations then they would be 
reasons, but not because my inability to respond explains their not being reasons. 
Instead, if I could respond to them, that would be because they were reasons.20  
However, it does not seem open to Shah and Velleman to claim that the 
considerations at issue are reasons in the counterfactual scenario described. Shah 
and Velleman are committed to the claim that it is a conceptual truth that only 
evidential considerations can be reasons for belief. Thus, in the scenario presented 
earlier, where an agent believes that the earth is flat in order to prevent the 
demon destroying the world, they would need to claim that the agent takes the 
demon’s threat to be evidence that the world is flat. But it seems clear that the 
demon’s threat is not evidence, and we can even add to the scenario that the agent 
doesn’t take it to be evidence, and still generate the intuitive judgment that the 
agent’s believing that the earth is flat on this basis would not be rationally 
criticisable. Thus, Shah and Velleman cannot offer as an explanation for the 
counterfactual the claim that the demon’s threat is a reason in this scenario, since 
this would be to abandon the claim that reasons must, as a matter of conceptual 
necessity, be considerations the agent takes to be evidence.  
Cases of ‘motivated irrationality’ might seem to provide examples of cases 
where it is in fact rationally permissible to do indirectly what it would be 
rationally criticisable to do directly. Parfit,21 for example, imagines a scenario in 
which a robber is trying to force you to open your safe so he can steal the gold, 
and he is willing to torture you or threaten your family in order to get you to 
comply. If you had a pill that would make you utterly irrational, Parfit argues, 
then the rational thing to do would be to take the pill. After all, if you were 
                                                                
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
21 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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utterly irrational, you would not respond rationally to the robber’s threats, and so 
he would realize that there was no point in making these threats or carrying them 
out. Parfit describes the scenario playing out:  
Reeling about the room, I say to the man: ‘go ahead. I love my children. So please 
kill them.’ The man tries to get the gold by torturing me. I cry out: ‘this is agony. 
So please go on.’ Given the state that I am in, the man is now powerless. He can 
do nothing that would force me to open the safe. Threats and torture cannot 
force concessions from someone is so irrational. The man can only flee, hoping to 
escape the police.22  
Cases of threats and deterrence may provide similar examples. If I can inculcate in 
myself a disposition to always carry out my threats, even when doing so is 
irrational,23 this may be beneficial. Those I threaten, aware of my irrational 
disposition, might then accede to my demands, and thus I never have to actually 
carry through on my threats, so I end up benefitting.24 In these situations it seems 
perfectly rational to make oneself irrational. However, performing the irrational 
actions directly would still be rationally criticisable. I would be rationally 
criticisable to directly act on my terrible threat, even if it is rational to bring about 
my disposition to carry out threats. This seems to provide a counter-example to 
the above argument, by suggesting cases in which it is rationally permissible to 
bring about what would be irrational to do directly.  
However, these cases are importantly different from the scenario we began 
with. In the cases of motivated irrationality, what is rational to bring about is the 
disposition to perform irrational acts. We are not seeking to indirectly bring about 
an attitude or an action, but a disposition, and the benefit of the indirect actions is 
derived from the benefit of having this disposition. Performing the irrational 
actions directly would fail to realize this benefit. Carrying out a threat out of the 
blue fails to achieve the benefit of having the disposition to carry out threats, since 
the whole point of the disposition is deterrence. In the evil demon case we began 
with, the situation is different. What renders it rational to bring it about that I 
believe the earth is flat is the benefit of believing that the earth is flat; in 
particular, the fact that this belief will persuade the demon not to destroy the 
world. But forming the belief directly also achieves this very same result. It would 
be very odd if one and the same result could be achieved either directly or 
                                                                
22 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 13. 
23 Due to the amount of harm carrying out my threat will lead to both for myself and for the 
threatened individual. 
24 Cf. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, David Gauthier, “Assure and Threaten,” Ethics 104, 4 (1994): 
690-721. 
Transparency and Reasons for Belief 
489 
indirectly, and the benefit of the result makes the indirect method rational but not 
the direct method. It is not as if the direct method has terrible side effects that the 
indirect method lacks - the end result is identical, and if anything the indirect 
methods are more liable to produce undesirable side effects and cost extra time 
and effort.  
But what if the evil demon threatens to destroy the world unless you 
believe something irrational? Wouldn’t this show that sometimes one has a reason 
to indirectly bring something about, even though doing it directly would be 
irrational? After all, I have very good reason to bring it about that I believe 
something irrational, but by hypothesis I don’t have any good reason to believe 
the irrational thing directly; if I did, it would be rational, and hence useless in my 
attempt to satisfy the demon. However, this is actually just another case where it 
is independently impossible to form a belief for a given reason; and hence, it has 
the wrong order of explanation to help Shah and Velleman. This is a bit easier to 
see in the practical case. Imagine that the demon has instead threatened to destroy 
the world unless I perform an irrational action. Imagine that, in order to comply 
with the demon, I hit myself in the head with a hammer as hard as I can. Is this 
irrational? It certainly would be normally. But in this case, if I am doing it because 
I believe this is the best way to prevent the demon destroying the world, then it in 
fact seems perfectly rational. Which, of course, defeats the point. So we have a 
conundrum. Almost anything I could do would be rendered rational by seeing it as 
a means to preventing the world being destroyed. And anything I shouldn’t do 
even to save the world presumably still shouldn’t be done. If I have a button that 
destroys the galaxy, then pressing this in order to prevent the world being 
destroyed would still be irrational, but only because pressing it is so much worse 
than the world being destroyed, so someone who does so is rationally (and 
morally) criticisable.25 Thus, it seems that the only way to do something irrational 
is for that action not to be done in order to satisfy the demon, since this is a strong 
enough reason to render almost anything rational. But it seems plausible that the 
only way to do something irrational without it being done in order to save the 
world is to bring about the irrational action indirectly, perhaps by inculcating an 
irrational disposition in oneself and trying to forget the demon’s threat altogether. 
However, this is not because there is anything wrong with the reasons I would be 
acting on if I acted directly. Preventing the demon from destroying the world is an 
                                                                
25 The same goes for non-consequentialist reasons, although it is hard to think of examples of 
non-consequentialist reasons that are stronger than the reason in favour of saving the world. 
Still, if they exist, then presumably it would be wrong to violate this requirement even to save 
the world, so someone who does so is still rationally criticisable. 
Benjamin Wald  
490 
excellent reason to do something irrational, or would be if I could actually act on 
it. Sadly, precisely because it is such a strong reason, it is impossible to act for this 
reason. It will render the action I am trying to perform rational after all, defeating 
the purpose. Thus, here too, the order of explanation is wrong for this example to 
help Shah and Velleman. It is not that I lack sufficient reason to act irrationally, 
and this explains my inability to so act. Instead, only my inability to act for this 
reason prevents it from being an excellent reason. The same goes for the case of 
belief.  
One could object at this point that there is at least some sense in which 
someone who intentionally forms a false belief in order to save the world is 
rationally criticisable. Even if we recognize the great practical benefits at stake, we 
might still say that they would be epistemically irrational to form a belief they 
took to be false.26 The idea here is that epistemic reasons and practical reasons are 
not commensurable; they are two entirely separate standards of assessment. 
Epistemic reasons, on this view, are just those reasons that have to do with the 
truth or falsity of our beliefs, and we are epistemically irrational insofar as we fail 
to believe in accordance with these reasons. We can, of course, label a certain class 
of reasons as ‘epistemic reasons,’ and define corresponding notions of 
‘epistemically rational’ and so on to accompany it. But this fails to address the 
main issue. The question of what to believe is a deliberative question facing 
agents. Recall our imagined agent who can deliberatively form beliefs on the basis 
of either evidential or non-evidential considerations. Such an agent would need to 
determine what they should believe. To tell them that there is one answer to what 
they should epistemically believe, and a different answer to what they should 
practically believe would be unhelpful- they would still be left with the 
unanswered question of what they should believe simpliciter. Imagine such an 
agent who is confronted by the evil demon who will destroy the world unless she 
believes the earth is flat. She knows the practical reasons favour believing that the 
world is flat, and the epistemic reasons favour believing that it is not flat, but she 
remains unsure what to believe. Is there really no further fact of the matter about 
what she should believe? This seems highly implausible.27 Of course, we might 
                                                                
26 It’s not obvious that this solution will help Shah and Velleman. However, perhaps they could 
provide some further argument to explain why in deliberation we need to form beliefs not just 
for a reason, but for an epistemic reason. As I shall show, this move does not seem promising. 
27 This same point is frequently made about practical rationality. Some theorists about practical 
reason claim that there is no such thing as what ought to be done simpliciter, but only what 
ought to be done according to morality, what ought to be done according to self-interest, and so 
on (Cf. Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” The Philosophical 
Review 81, 3 (1972): 305-316, David Copp, “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of 
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object that a believer who is capable of settling deliberation for either evidential 
or practical reasons is incoherent. The mental states formed by such a being just 
would not count as beliefs, we might suspect. But if so, this just shows that the 
true explanation of transparency lies with the explanation of why positing such a 
believer is incoerent, rather than with normativism about the aim of belief. 
4. Internalism about Epistemic Reasons 
The above argument suggests that there is nothing rationally criticisable about 
believing for non-evidential reasons. However, it does not necessarily follow that 
such considerations are in fact reasons for belief. Consider the following principle:  
EPISTEMIC REASONS INTERNALISM: For some consideration p to be a reason 
to believe q, it must be possible for an agent to believe q for this very reason. 
To unpack this claim, let us introduce the idea of a motivating reason for 
belief, by analogy with concept of a motivating reason for action. The motivating 
reason for one of my beliefs is, roughly, the consideration in light of which I form 
the belief, and also what I would appeal to if my belief were challenged.28 Note 
that the way that I have described it, a motivating reason for belief is not usually a 
psychological fact, but instead a fact, or putative fact, about the world. After all, I 
would not usually appeal to my own psychology if challenged to defend one of my 
beliefs – I would appeal to what I took to be evidence for the belief.29 We can 
                                                                                                                                       
Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy 14, 1 (2007): 86-106). However, many other theorists 
object that there must be such a thing as what we ought to do simpliciter, and that this is shown 
by the fact that, even after being told what morality recommends and what self-interest 
recommends, it is coherent and indeed natural to persist in asking what one ought to do (Cf. 
Stephen Darwall, “Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction,” in Moral 
Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches, ed.  Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, 
and Peter Railton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 305-312, Sharon Street, “Reply to 
Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About,” 
Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 207-228). 
28 This is not meant to be a definition of an explanatory reason for belief: it is intended to fix our 
attention on the appropriate phenomenon. For further discussion of motivating reasons in 
practical reason, see Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
1994), Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), Kieran Setiya, 
Reasons without Rationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). For discussion of 
this same distinction applied to belief, see Kieran Setiya, “Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts,” 
Philosophical Issues 23 (2013): 179-198, Pamela Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason,” The 
Journal of Philosophy 102, 9 (2005): 437- 457.  
29 Sometimes psychological facts may be motivating reasons for belief, as when I take the fact 
that I keep having sad thoughts as evidence that I am depressed, but this will not be the usual 
case. 
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contrast this with the idea of a normative reason for belief, which is the kind of 
consideration that actually counts in favour, normatively, of the belief. With this 
contrast in place, the suggestion under consideration is that for some fact to be a 
normative reason for belief, it must be capable of being a motivating reason for 
belief. This principle would be the theoretical analogue of a fairly weak form of 
internalism about practical reasons. Some philosophers hold that for something to 
be a normative reason for an agent that agent must be able to become motivated to 
act on the reason given their existing desires and psychology.30 Our proposed 
principle is much weaker, since as I will argue the notion of possibility at issue is 
weaker than the kind of psychological possibility appealed to in these more 
strongly internalist arguments. 
Epistemic reasons internalism may at first seem implausible. Consider 
someone who, perhaps due to very effective brainwashing in their youth, is 
unable to believe in the theory of evolution, and therefore unable to believe in the 
theory for the reason that it is supported by the best scientific evidence. This 
doesn’t seem to show that this evidence thereby provides such a person with no 
reason to believe in the theory of evolution. The wealth of evidence for the theory 
still gives them very strong reason to believe it, even if they are unable to respond 
rationally to this evidence. However, I suspect that this is an issue of finding the 
correct notion of possibility. It may be psychologically impossible for the 
brainwashed individual to believe in the theory of evolution but this just shows 
that we should make use of a weaker form of possibility. The most plausible 
candidate is conceptual possibility. It must be at least conceptually possible for an 
agent to take some consideration as a motivating reason for belief for that 
consideration to be a normative reason for belief for that agent.  
Furthermore, if we were right in claiming that transparency is a conceptual 
claim, then this will establish that non-evidential considerations cannot be reasons 
for belief. Of course, we will need some explanation of why transparency is a 
conceptual truth that does not, like Shah and Velleman’s argument, rely on 
normativism. We might, for instance, argue that it is a conceptual truth about 
beliefs that they are mental states formed in response to evidential considerations. 
We can form representational mental states on the basis of considerations we do 
not take to bear on the truth of the content of such states, but these states will 
thereby fail to count as beliefs. They might instead be suppositions or 
                                                                
30 Cf. Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in his Moral Luck, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101-113, David Velleman, “The Possibility of Practical 
Reason,” Ethics 106 (1996): 694-726.  
Transparency and Reasons for Belief 
493 
imaginations. Pamela Hieronymi,31 for example, presents a non-normative 
argument that, if successful, would also establish that it is a conceptual truth that 
beliefs must be held for evidential reasons, by identifying the belief that P with 
the agent’s answer to the question of whether p. Non-evidential considerations 
may make me wish that I could answer this question one way rather than another, 
but I can only actually settle the question, and thus form the belief, on the basis of 
considerations I take to be relevant to whether p, i.e. evidence. Shah and 
Velleman’s argument relies on the idea that “deliberation is reasoning aimed at 
issuing in some result in accordance with norms for results of that kind”32. They 
then go on to argue that it is the norm governed aspect of deliberation that 
explains transparency - any agent who possesses the concept of belief must accept 
that truth is the only norm for beliefs. But we can use the characterization of 
deliberation given by Shah and Velleman to explain transparency even if we reject 
normativism. Deliberation not only aims to accord with norms for the result 
produced, it also aims at actually producing the result. Thus, deliberation about 
what to believe aims to produce belief. But if belief is, as a conceptual matter, 
something that must be formed on the basis of evidence, then deliberation about 
what to believe will be restricted to evidential considerations, because taking 
account of any other kind of consideration could not actually produce belief. If 
true, this account would show that there are no non-evidential reasons for belief, 
but this would be explained by transparency (together with the conceptual truths 
about deliberation and belief), and so could not be used to explain transparency 
without circularity. Thus, the truth of evidentialism on its own is not enough to 
save Shah and Velleman’s argument. They need it to be the case that we cannot 
form beliefs for non-evidential reasons because there are no such reasons. 
However, epistemic reasons internalism need not establish this direction of 
explanation. Even if true, it might instead establish that there are no non-
evidential reasons for belief because we cannot believe based on them.  
Conclusion 
Shah and Velleman’s view, then, fails to adequately explain transparency. Non-
evidential considerations would be reasons for belief, if we were able to form 
beliefs on the basis of such considerations. Thus, we cannot explain our inability 
to form such beliefs as a result of their not being reasons for belief – to do so 
would be circular. And this same argument suggests that the prospects for any 
                                                                
31 Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kinds of Reasons.” 
32 Nishi Shah, “A New Argument for Evidentialism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 56, 225 
(2006): 481-498.  
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normative theory of the aim of belief being used as an explanation for 
transparency are dubious. This is, of course, a particular problem for Shah and 
Velleman’s view. The purported ability of their theory to explain transparency 
served as the major argument for the view, so if this explanation fails the view is 
left largely unmotivated. However, I think this argument has implications for 
other views about the aim of belief. The original thought, that transparency has 
something to do with the aim of belief, remains highly compelling. Why, in 
deliberation, must our answer to the question of what to believe be resolved by 
our answer to the question of what is the case? Well, it seems plausible that it is 
because we are trying to form a belief in deliberating, and belief aims at truth. 
Absent an account of the aim of belief, this explanation is merely a sketch, but it 
seems to be on the right track. If, as I have suggested, we cannot explain 
transparency in terms of a norm of belief, then we will have to reject the 
suggestion that normativists can explain transparency by appeal to the aim of 
belief. Now, perhaps there is an explanation of transparency that has nothing to do 
with the aim of belief. I have certainly not said anything to rule out this 
possibility. But a theory that could account both for transparency and for the aim 
of belief seems like it would have a distinct advantage, and the inability of 
normativist understandings of the aim of belief to provide such a unified account 
is a mark against it.33 
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